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The enormous impact of offshore accounts and bank secrecy on developing countries raises a critical question: Do states like Switzerland, which provide a tax haven for wealthy citizens of developing countries, violate internationally recognized human rights?
The implementation of FATCA has begun to end bank secrecy and to require automatic information reporting of income earned by U.S. citizens in offshore investment accounts. Moreover, recent commitments by Austria, Luxembourg, and Switzerland mark a beginning to the end of bank secrecy in Europe and movement toward automatic information reporting of income earned by There are two further possible objections to concluding that a state providing a tax haven for offshore accounts violates human rights recognized by the Covenant. Even if the government of the account holder receives information about the offshore account, it may lack the capacity to collect the revenue that is legally owed.
Even if the revenue is collected, there is no assurance that it will be used to progressively realize the rights recognized by the Covenant.
Thus, there is no certainty of an actual connection between one country providing secrecy for investment accounts of the taxpayers of another country and the resulting failure of the second country to progressively realize Covenant rights.
There are also varying degrees of state responsibility for the offshore accounts within its jurisdiction. The degree of responsibility may depend on whether a state enacts bank secrecy laws criminalizing the disclosure of financial information to tax authorities, fails to apply a withholding tax on offshore accounts at a rate sufficient to deter their use for tax evasion, evades requests for information about offshore accounts from other governments conducting taxpayer investigations, or otherwise limits efforts to allow for more extensive automatic information exchange. The responsibility is particularly great in the case of Switzerland, which manages 30% of all individual wealth held through offshore accounts, has a legal regime that has criminalized the disclosure of financial information, and has refused to withhold tax on offshore account income or provide financial information about offshore accounts, except when under enormous pressure from powerful governments, such as Germany, the UK, and the United States, or when it views agreeing to provide withholding to a given group of countries (weak EU states) as a mechanism to limit pressure to help other, often poorer (at least on a GDP/capita basis) states.
No international mechanism exists for actually enforcing the Thus, it may not be crucial to definitively determine whether, as a technical matter, the maintenance of secrecy for offshore accounts constitutes a violation of internationally recognized human rights.
Whether state obligations under the Covenant are extraterritorial, whether revenues owed would actually be collected, and, whether, if collected, revenues would be appropriately used is less important than recognizing the fact that secrecy for offshore accounts makes it difficult for developing countries to implement Covenant obligations.
It therefore seems indisputable that offshore accounts impede the fulfillment of internationally recognized human rights. Recognition of this fact could accelerate the growing international effort to curb bank secrecy for offshore accounts and establish a multilateral automatic information exchange system so that developing countries, as well as industrialized countries, benefit.
